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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-3809 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VINCENT L. RUCHLEWICZ, 
                      Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 3-09-cr-00002-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Kim R. Gibson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 17, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                                   
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Vincent Ruchlewicz appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He contends that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to argue that the Government violated a Department of Justice 
policy that discourages federal prosecutors from initiating criminal cases following a 
state prosecution for substantially the same acts and that the Government engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct by pursuing a case that allegedly violated the policy.1  Because 
this policy confers no substantive rights, we will affirm. 
I 
On March 4, 2004, Ruchlewicz went to Lawrence Sisco’s apartment in DuBois, 
Pennsylvania, looking for two men.  Upon learning that they were not present, 
Ruchlewicz pulled out a pistol, pointed it at Sisco, and fired a round into the floor.  Local 
police subsequently interviewed Ruchlewicz, arrested him, and charged him with 
numerous crimes in Pennsylvania state court.  He ultimately entered guilty pleas to 
attempted aggravated assault and reckless endangerment of another person.  Ruchlewicz 
also later entered a guilty plea to the Pennsylvania crime of carrying a firearm without a 
license.  All three of the Pennsylvania crimes to which Ruchlewicz pleaded guilty 
concerned the March 4 incident at Sisco’s apartment. 
                                                   
1 Before the District Court, Ruchlewicz claimed only that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to make this argument.  On appeal, Ruchlewicz also asserts that a 
violation of the Department’s policy evinces prosecutorial misconduct.  Because 
Ruchlewicz did not make this argument before the District Court, it is waived.  See 
United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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This incident also led the police to search Ruchlewicz’s home, where they 
discovered seven handguns, none of which were used in the assault on Sisco.  A federal 
grand jury returned an indictment that charged Ruchlewicz with unlawful possession of 
two of these handguns, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Ruchlewicz entered a 
guilty plea to this offense, and he received a sentence of seventy-two months’ 
imprisonment. 
Ruchlewicz filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255, contending that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the federal 
prosecution following his Pennsylvania prosecutions violated the Department of Justice’s 
so-called Petite Policy, named for Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), which 
generally bars a federal prosecution following a state prosecution for the same acts.  The 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court deny the motion because counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to invoke the Petite Policy, as “it is an internal guideline 
for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, does not create a substantive right for the 
defendant which he may enforce, and is not subject to judicial review.”  App. 14.  The 
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and denied Ruchlewicz’s 
motion to vacate, but issued a certificate of appealability “on the question whether a 
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violation of the Petite [P]olicy gives rise to a legally enforceable claim.”  App. 18.  
Ruchlewicz appeals.2 
II 
 The Petite Policy “precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, 
following a prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or 
transaction(s), absent certain extenuating circumstances.”  United States v. Wilson, 413 
F.3d 382, 388 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Its general bar on 
federal prosecutions based on acts that supported an earlier state prosecution is “not 
constitutionally mandated” because “the dual sovereignty principle inherent in our federal 
system” permits such successive prosecutions by different sovereigns.  Rinaldi v. United 
States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, the policy 
guides the internal operations of the Department of Justice concerning when it should 
expend its resources to prosecute conduct that has been the subject of a state prosecution.  
Such internal “guidelines and policies do not create enforceable rights for criminal 
defendants.”  Wilson, 413 F.3d at 389.  Thus, the Petite Policy grants Ruchlewicz no 
enforceable rights, and Ruchlewicz’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue 
that the policy was violated.  The District Court therefore properly denied Ruchlewicz’s 
§ 2255 motion. 
                                                   
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We review the 
District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  United 
States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
